One may doubt the relevance of the subject for discussion, namely, "A Stable Government for India," after the resounding success of the National Democratic Alliance at recent general elections in our country and the promise of a stable government for the country for the full term of the 13th Lok Sabha. While I warmly welcome the decisive verdict of the electorate and wish the National Democratic Alliance a fruitful tenure of the statutory period of five years, I am not sure that with our present electoral system and the Constitution that we may not revert to the era of kaleidoscopic changes in government. Unless some effective changes are made in our political system, the danger of unstable and frequently changing governments and policies cannot be avoided.

During the last ten years, there had been seven governments at the centre. These minority governments have been unable to provide a stable government and stable policies. Barring the Narasimha Rao government, which had a precarious existence for a full term of five years, others were in office for a few months each. I had the dubious distinction of appointing three, and working with four, Prime Ministers during the term of 5 years. Governments depending on the whims and fancies of small parties supporting from inside or outside were all the time striving to survive in office and had no time to serve the people or the nation. Recently the situation had deteriorated so much that the smaller parties had begun to blackmail the leadership with threats of disruption of the government. Truly the tail had started wagging the head.

No progress economic, social, cultural or other can be achieved unless there is internal stability and continuity of policies. Nor can incentives for production and exports and tax concessions for industry and trade enthuse investment unless there is a stable government pursuing sound economic policies. For instance, India made striking progress in Industrial Development during the first fifteen years of our Republic when we had a stable government under the enlightened leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru. In contrast, France had 22 governments in 12 years during 1946­1958, until De Gaulle ushered the new constitution which was approved by the people at a referendum in 1958. Since then, France has been making striking all-round progress.

One immediate measure to reduce kaleidoscopic changes in government, which does not require any constitutional amendment or other elaborate changes, is to provide in the Rules of Procedure of the Lok Sabha that a motion of no confidence against the ministry should in the same motion name the Prime Minister to succeed the present incumbent if the motion carries. This system prevails in Germany where there is a multi-party system. The motion for the removal of the Chancellor names the successor in the motion itself so that if the motion carries there would be another Chancellor already chosen by the House. The constitution of India prescribes that the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the House of People. It is the Rules of Procedure which define the mode of removal of the Ministry. The Lok Sabha is therefore fully competent to adopt the aforesaid rule.

In a multi-party system, parties can unite for bringing down the government but may not agree on a successor government as happened in our country recently. The rule envisaged will prevent reckless wrecking of governments.

This reform alone cannot resolve all the political maladies that afflict our nation. The bane of small parties wrecking the government may be reduced but not eliminated under the reform referred to above. We will have to examine other alternatives for securing a stable government for the nation.

India on becoming independent deliberately chose the Westminster type of parliamentary democracy. Most of the leaders of the struggle for freedom were from the legal profession with skills to match the foreign government in knowledge and debate. Many among them have had their education, general and legal, in England and had imbibed the liberal traditions of Mill and Laski. Besides, Britain, in their days was a super-power spread over the entire globe and as it used to be said, "the sun never sets in the British Empire." Authors and pandits extolled the British Parliamentary system so profusely that it appealed to many intellectuals in the world as an unerring model for others to follow. Ivor Jennings described the British constitution as one of the strongest, if not the strongest, in the world. Dr. K. M. Munshi, one of the architects of our constitution, summed up the prevalent thinking at the time in his speech in the Constitution Assembly:

"Most of us and during the last several generation before us, public men in India, have looked up to the British model as the best. For the last thirty or forty years, some kind of responsibility has been introduced in the governance of this country. After this experience, why should we go back on the tradition that has been built for over 100 years."

No wonder, we adopted the Westminster type of parliamentary democracy, with the addition of a few chapters such as Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State Policy etc.

During the first decade, when the stalwarts of the Freedom movement brewed in selfless dedication, service and sacrifice held sway of the country. India functioned as a mature democracy and elicited the admiration of the entire world including that of the sceptics who doubted the chances of adult franchise working satisfactorily among unlettered people. In International fora like the United Nations and others we were heard with respect and attention. Our felicity of expression in the international language, namely English, gave us an added advantage over others. That decade provided stability and growth to the Central and State Governments.

Thereafter several weaknesses and flaws in the functioning of our democracy surfaced throughout the country, casting considerable doubt over the stability and strength of the State and Central Governments. In Kerala, the Congress Ministry was defeated by defection of Congress members themselves. In Congress legislature parties, dissident groups developed, threatening the Ministry every now and then. Government were engaged more in their survival rather than in service of the people. Mushroom parties unable to provide a viable alternative government sprang up every other day. Multi-party system was found incompatible with the Westminster type of democracy based on Two-Party system.

I therefore, fired the first salvo against the Cabinet Form in 1965 (35 years ago) by sending a resolution to the All India Congress Committee (AICC) asking for the constitution of a Committee to examine and report:

"Whether the present Cabinet form of Government at the Centre and the states may be replaced by an executive directly elected by the people for a fixed term of years and if so to recommend consequential changes in the Constitution of India as appropriate."

(VideThe Presidential Systems
 by A.G. Noorani p.32).

The Westminster pattern of Parliamentary Democracy has succeeded only in countries like Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, apart from Britain, all of which have a sound two-party system. Despite centuries, these countries and the United States have had strong two parties so that one or the other party represents the majority of the nation in a general election. On the other hand, parties in India split overnight and the number of parties goes on increasing instead of reducing. I said at that time that

"the hope that in a multi-party system, dependence on one or more small groups will become necessary to form government seems to encourage the formation of smaller groups in the legislature. These groups expect that they will be able to hold balance of power and obtain bargaining strength." (Vide The Presidential System by A.G. Noorani, p. 30)

The Westminster type of Parliamentary Democracy on which our Constitution has been modeled has many attractive features. The Prime Minister, being the leader of the majority party in Parliament, is able, unlike the American President, to carry out his policies and programs without any hindrance. Besides the chances of conflict between the legislature and the executive are minimal. Furthermore, Executive's accountability to Parliament is total and the continuance of the government itself depends on the support of the majority in Parliament. However, if the major parties, Conservatives and Labour, split into two each, all tangles which plague Indian Parliament will be re-enacted in Britain also. Ivor Jennings dealing with prerogative of the Crown to decline the Prime Minister's advice for dissolution of the House in limited cases in his book Cabinet Government (3rd edition pp.427­428) has said that while the Queen's personal prerogative to dissolve the House is maintained in theory, there are hardly any circumstances in which it could be exercised in practice. He added that this assumed a continuance of the two-party system. "If major parties break up, the whole balance of the constitution alters and then possibly the Queen's prerogative becomes important. (Vide Constitutional and Administrative Law,7th Edition  by Hood Philips, page 154­155).

Ivor Jennings himself concedes that the British model is based on a two-party system and the whole balance of the British Constitution will change if the major parties in Britain break up like ours.

Therefore, if the present Constitution is to function satisfactorily two reforms -- change in the electoral system and de-recognition of more than two political parties -- are indispensable.

In a multi-party system, no candidate to the legislature normally secures more than 50% of the votes cast in his constituency. Each candidate usually secures say 35% or 30% or 25% of the votes cast, and the candidate who gets the largest number of votes is declared elected. Similarly, if in all the other constituencies the candidate with the largest number of votes (but not a majority) is elected, the House so constituted reflects the minority and not the majority of the voters. In a two-party system such an aberration does not occur as one or the other party has to secure a majority of the votes in every constituency. In none of the general elections held in India since 1952 did the ruling party ever get a majority of the votes cast. For instance the Congress Party which secured a massive 415 seats in Lok Sabha in 1984 polled only 48.1% of the votes cast. Likewise, the Janata Government in 1977, which secured 296 seats in Lok Sabha, polled only 43% of the votes cast. For the last 50 years, India has been governed by a minority of votes. This defect has been remedied in France, where if no candidate to the National Assembly (Parliament) secures more than 50% of the votes cast there is a run off, a repoll between the top two candidates, and the successful candidate is declared elected. By this process the National Assembly always represents the majority of votes cast. This may be effected by amendment to the Peoples Representation Act and will not call for the amendment of the Constitution.

Under our electoral system, the Election Commission is empowered to recognise and de-recognise political parties. The de-recognised parties lose certain privileges, the most important of which is the right to a common symbol for their candidates. In order to reduce the number of recognised parties to two, it may be statutorily provided that all parties which secure less than 10% of the votes cast in the next Union General Election shall be first de-recognised, and that thereafter the party which secures the lowest number of votes in each general election shall be de-recognised, until the number of recognised parties is reduced to two.

This scheme, I am advised, will not be violative of the Fundamental Right to form associations or unions, since the scheme does not interfere with formation of political parties but will only restrict their right to recognition for electoral purposes. Even a constitution amendment, if necessary, will be in the best interest of the Nation.

I am not sure whether even a two-party system will ensure stability in government in our country. It is still possible for a chunk of the ruling party to cross the floor and defeat the government as it first happened in Kerala and thereafter in other states also. Perhaps a more stringent Anti-Defection Law debarring every defecting member, whether one or one-third of a party, from any election to any statutory body from Panchayat to the President, for six years may put a sense of responsibility in the minds of the legislators.

Our experience during the last decade has proved that minority government based on the support of small parties, either free inside or outside the government, has been an exercise in self-deception. The minority governments were not able to act freely and have had to look over their shoulders, all the time nervous, anxious, and uncertain as to how the supporting parties will behave. The minority governments had to spend all the time placating their supporters and making unconscionable concessions and compromises. Very often the supporting partners had brought down the government on trivial and inconsequential issues.

The second alternative I propose for a stable government is a national government consisting of the parties in the House. I had suggested it in 1991 at the time of the acute Exchange crisis, developed it in Anantasayanam Iyengar Memorial Lecture at Tirupati in 1995 under the title "A Stable National Alternative to Party Government" and refined it again in a seminar in Delhi presided over by Justice Tarkunda under the title "Government by Consensus: or Consensual Government." I will not examine the American, French or any other constitution as each one of them falls short of the ideal solution I have in mind. It is a solution not only for India but for all nascent democracies of the world. The acute problems of poverty, illiteracy, disease, and age-old social and economic inequalities faced by the developing countries, call for a national effort by all parties putting their shoulders together and working in unison and not for a system based on confrontation between the Government and the opposition. More so in India which has a gigantic population and meager resources.

Modern democracy is based on the rule by the majority which means that 50.1% rules the country, excluding 49.9% from participation in administration. It rests on confrontation between the government and opposition. It excludes large section of the people from participation in decision-making through their representatives. It breeds jealousy among the deprived and arrogance among the rulers. It leads to abuse of the government machinery for strengthening the party in power. In mature democracies the opposition is reconciled to bide its time till the next general election though it tries to defeat the government on popular issues. Nascent democracies attempt to destablise the government from the very next day after the formation of the government. Engineering defections and purchase of political loyalties are resorted to without any care or concern for the nation and the people. The tendency to substitute duels for debates is growing in legislatures. Parliamentary dignity and decorum are found only in textbooks of political science. We have all been witnesses to these unseemly activities in our legislatures.

Indian tradition has been different. Panchayats were not run by majority to the exclusion of minority, but by consensus of the elders. There were no political parties and no confrontation between administration and opposition. Decisions were reached by a consensus, not by counting of heads. Similarly, justice was rendered by the Panchayat seeking the truth and not by adversary proceedings where each contending party tries to establish the truth. Likewise class conflicts in Trade Unions had replaced the paternal relationship that prevailed in agriculture which was the main source of employment in the earlier economy. In retrospect I realise the British innovation of confrontation through party government adversary proceedings in rendering justice and class conflict in industrial relations had deflected the country from its age-old system of reaching solutions by consent, consensus, cooperation and compromise.

We must therefore devise a system of government with adequate participation of sections of opinion represented by political parties in the place of a majority party rule. This will involve some changes in our constitution but not a wholesale redrafting of it. Any attempt to rewrite the constitution will lead to utter chaos and confusion which it is not necessary to create.

The scheme may be called National Government for India or Government by Consensus or a Stable Government for India for the purposes of our discussion.

Under this Scheme: There shall be a President of India elected in the same manner as at present or otherwise but not directly by the people of India. The election of a President by popular vote will create a second centre of authority in the State and will breed conflicts between the President and the Prime Minister. The President shall continue to be symbol of the State.

Clauses 1, 2, and 3 of Art.75, namely: 75 (1)  The Prime Minister shall be appointed by the President and the other Minister shall be appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister.

75 (2) That the Ministers shall hold office during the pleasure of the President.

75 (3) The Council of Minister shall be collectively responsible to the House of People.

These shall be deleted; instead, it shall be provided:

That the Prime Minister shall, as soon as may be after the general election or on the occurrence of a vacancy in that office by death resignation or otherwise, be elected by the Lok Sabha by a single transferable vote. If not one gets more that 50% of the votes polled, there shall be a run off repoll between the two candidates who had secured the largest number of votes and the winner shall be declared the Prime Minister.

The number of members of the Council of Ministers shall not exceed one-tenth of the strength of the Lok Sabha.

The Prime Minister shall determine the number of members of the Council of Minister to be chosen from Rajya Sabha and the Lok Sabha.

On such determination each House shall proceed to elect the requisite number by single transferable vote as in the case of election to Parliamentary Committees.

The Prime Minister and the Members of the Council of Ministers shall hold office for a term of five years coterminous with the life of the Lok Sabha but shall continue in office till a new Prime Minister is elected in the manner provided. The Council of Ministers shall not be liable to be removed from office on the ground that any measures brought by it in either House of Parliament had been defeated nor by a vote of no confidence in the Lok Sabha. Vacancies in the Council of Ministers shall be filled in the same manner as those in Parliamentary Committees.

The decisions of Parliament shall be binding on the Council of Ministers including the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister with consent of the Council of Ministers may however send a matter for reconsideration by the Houses of Parliament and the decision of the House on such reconsideration shall be final and conclusive.

Art. 74 (1) dealing with President's duty to accept the recommendations of the Council of Ministers and power to return the advice for reconsideration of the Council of minister and, Art. 111 relating to assent of bills shall be deleted.

Decisions of the Council of Ministers shall normally be taken by consensus. If however a majority of the ministers present so desire a vote shall be taken on an issue. The decision of the Council of Ministers is binding on all members including the Prime Minister.

In order to truly reflect public opinion, the Lok Sabha members shall be elected in the same manner as members of the French National Assembly described earlier.

The Lok Sabha shall not be subject to dissolution before the expiry of its term on any account. Subject to rules of procedure there shall be complete freedom of speech and vote in both Houses of Parliament.

Defections take place in Parliament largely from selfish ends like defeating the present government in order to get into the new one. Since neither the ministry can be thrown out of office, nor the Parliament dissolved before the expiry of their respective terms, there is no reason why the members should not have the right to speak or vote against Government's proposals. Members of the American Congress and Senate speak and vote across party lines. Nobody looks upon it as blasphemy. It is the fixation in our minds with the British model of parliamentary democracy that inhibits objective thinking on such matter. In these circumstances the Anti-Defection Law becomes irrelevant and needs to be repealed.

It may be recalled that during the time (1950­52) when the Provisional Parliament was functioning in our country, the cabinet of Jawaharlal Nehru included members of other parties like Shyam Prasad Mukhurji, Dr. Ambedkar, K. C. Neogy, etc. I was a witness to the smooth working of that team in a majority of issues though they had some sharp differences on a few. I do not see why a cabinet of talent drawn from all parties cannot arrive at a consensus and why the country should reconcile itself to a government of inconsequential members from a single party. For instance the Public Accounts Committee which deals with lapses of the Government, though consisting of representatives of all parties, almost always arrives at unanimous conclusions. Why should not a Council of Ministers do likewise in national interest?

It is sometimes argued that the accountability of the government to Parliament is reduced too in a system which has fixed Executives as in the Presidential form of America. In the scheme I propose all the present parliamentary checks like the question hour, adjournment motion calling attention, short duration discussion, etc. will be retained and accountability to Parliament will be fully maintained. As the decisions of the Parliament are binding on the executive without the power for the executive to escape from the decision through dissolution of the House, there will be a greater accountability to Parliament than at present.

In a democracy the citizen has a duty to elect a government for himself. Today the masses regard their franchise as a patronage to be conferred on their kith and kin, a local candidate, or one of his caste or religious fraternity. In order to inculcate his responsibility to the State I proposed during the discussion on the people Representation Bill in the Provisional Parliament in 1951, that voting in the election at the State and National level should be made compulsory. Dr. Ambedkar, who was piloting the Bill, while expressing sympathy with the idea pleaded practical difficulties in accepting the suggestion. It might have been difficult to introduce compulsory voting in 1952 when adult franchise was introduced for the first time. Fifty years later no one could plead practical difficulties as an excuse against a salutary reform. I would reiterate the suggestion on this occasion.

A new menace has appeared in our electoral process in recent times. It is the plethora of non-party candidates filing nominations in general election in recent times, the ballot paper has run to two or three pages. Increasing security deposits will hurt genuine candidates. It may, therefore, be provided statutorily that candidates will forfeit deposit if they poll less than 20% of the votes cast and the ones who forfeit deposits in the National and State elections shall be debarred from contesting for any elective post in a statutory body from Panchayat, cooperatives to the President for a period of six years. This will enable smoother election for offices of national importance.

The scheme for a stable or national or consensus government adumbrated by me is an amalgam of the Parliamentary and Presidential forms. The fixed executive and indissoluble legislature resemble the Presidential form and all the checks embodied in the constitution and Rules of procedure resemble the Parliamentary executive. The scheme will ensure:

1. Stability of government for the term specified for the executive and the Legislature.
2. Participation of most of the parties in the administration and thrashing out differences within the Council of Ministers.
3. Elimination of confrontation between the government and opposition.

The Scheme involves minimum changes in the constitution except in chapters relating to executive and the legislature. All other parts of the constitution particularly Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles of State Policy, Election machinery and the Judiciary etc. will remain as they are.

I admit that the scheme is not fool-proof. No constitution is. The chaos facing the country compels serious consideration of alternatives.

I commend the scheme for a Stable Government for India to the consideration of the nation. If we get over our mental fixation on party government, we may be able to get out of the rut and think freely, boldly and wisely.